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I. INTRODUCTION
The people typically arrested for simple drug possession are drug users who
posses an illegal drug for their own personal use.' Since the only person that a
drug user hurts through his immediate drug use is himself, possession of a small
amount of drugs is a relatively minor offense.2 In California, simple drug
possession has been treated leniently since the early 1970's. 3 Continuing in this
tradition, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 ("Proposition
36 ,4 mandates probation and drug treatment instead of jail for persons convicted
of "nonviolent" drug possession or drug possession for personal use.5 Proposition
36 applies to any qualifying conviction for nonviolent drug possession.6 It does
not apply to drug users whose drug use endangers public safety or threatens
1. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004) (characterizing "possession for personal
use" as a "nonviolent drug possession offense").
2. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004) (setting one-year in state
prison as the maximum penalty for violation of the offense of "unlawful possession"); infra Part U.B
(comparing drug diversion with Proposition 36).
3. E.g., id. § 1 1350(d)(1) (recommending, in addition to any other punishment a judge prescribes, a fine
or community service for a first offense of drug possession "[e]xcept in unusual cases"); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1000 (West 1985 & Supp. 2004) (allowing first offenders to receive "drug diversion" instead of ajail or
prison sentence for drug possession); infra Part 11.13 (comparing Proposition 36 with drug diversion); Telephone
Interview with Stacie Lawson, Deputy District Attorney, Santa Clara County (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter
Lawson Interview] (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (stating that, absent special circumstances, no
one convicted of simple drug possession as a first offense would receive prison as a sentence).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 1210.1 (West Supp. 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11999.4 -
11999.13 (West Supp. 2004).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210. 1 (a) (West Supp. 2004).
6. See infra Part H.A (discussing the provisions of Penal Code sections 1210 and 1210.1).
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others.7 This Comment considers whether prosecutors and the courts have fairly
administered Proposition 36.
California voters intended Proposition 36 to place drug addicts into
community-based treatment, without letting violent or dangerous drug users back
onto the street. 8 Proposition 36 grants "diversion" to repeat drug offenders,
mandating a sentence of probation instead of incarceration. 9 Under prior law, a
drug user was not eligible for diversion after the first offense; repeat drug
offenders were sentenced to jail, not drug treatment.'0 By comparison,
Proposition 36 makes available county drug treatment programs to habitual drug
users, affording them opportunities to recover formerly reserved to first
offenders. 1"
However, many people arrested for minor drug possession do not qualify for
Proposition 36 diversion, despite the initiative drafters' attempt to include a wide
range of minor drug offenses within the definition of a nonviolent drug offense.1
2
In spite of varying implementation of Proposition 36 by prosecutors,13
Proposition 36 interpretation by appellate courts appears to be striking the
appropriate balance.' 4 Drug offenders walk a fine line depending upon the
jurisdiction; a prosecutor may exclude nearly anyone under the right
circumstances. 
1 5
After explaining the specific aspects of Proposition 36, Part II compares the
technical framework of Proposition 36 to other drug diversion programs. Part III
summarizes arguments for and against Proposition 36. These arguments remain
7. See infra Part V (providing examples of concurrent offenses that disqualify drug offenders from
Proposition 36 diversion).
8. See infra Part II (comparing the opposing ballot arguments with the statements of purpose and intent
underlying the 2000 initiative).
9. Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, § 3, Purpose and Intent, subd.
(a) [hereinafter Proposition 36], reprinted in CAL. DIST. AT'Y'S ASS'N, Implementing Proposition 36, A-2
(n.d.), at http://www.cdaa.org/prop-36.pdf [hereinafter CDAA] ("[tlo divert from incarceration into
community-based substance abuse treatment programs nonviolent defendants ... charged with simple drug
possession or drug use offenses.").
10. See infra Part 11.B (contrasting Proposition 36 with drug diversion under Penal Code section 1000).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring drug treatment for nonviolent drug
abusers); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11999.4-11999.13 (West Supp. 2004) (establishing the "Substance
Abuse Treatment Trust Fund" enacted by Proposition 36); Telephone Interview with Judy Curry, Deputy Public
Defender, Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office (Nov. 13, 2003) (notes on file with McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that Los Angeles County has the widest sampling of drug treatment programs of any county in
the state).
12. Compare infra Part III (examining the policy behind Proposition 36), with infra Part V (illustrating
the problem of eligibility for drug treatment).
13. See infra Part IV (outlining the results of the student survey of Proposition 36 eligibility conducted
by the author).
14. See infra Part V (analyzing the decisions of appellate courts interpreting the eligibility criteria of
Proposition 36 and concluding that Proposition 36 is roughly achieving its main purpose of diverting drug
offenders out of jail and into treatment).
15. See infra Part V.7 (reporting prosecutors' remarks that a concurrent conviction for any misdemeanor
offense will disqualify someone under Penal Code section 1210.1 (b)(2)).
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the basis for appellate interpretation of Proposition 36. Part IV discusses the
author's interviews with prosecutors and public defenders. Finally, Part V
compares various offenses that either qualify or disqualify an individual for
diversion under Proposition 36. The article summarizes Proposition 36 eligibility,
and concludes that Proposition 36 does what it promised to do: it provides drug
addicts a second chance at treatment. rather than sending them to jail or prison.
H. PROPOSITION 36
Proposition 36 makes diversion available to repeat drug offenders, with
probation (rather than jail) being the mandatory sentence for a nonviolent drug
offense. 16 Those eligible for Proposition 36 receive drug treatment as a condition
of probation. 17 Proposition 36 is only available to drug offenders who satisfy the
qualifying provisions including conviction of a personal use drug offense,' 8 the
absence of specific collateral conduct,' 9 and the lack of any recent felony on their
criminal records.20 Additionally, the defendant must want to be treated, 2' and
22must be "amenable" to treatment. Proposition 36 differs from other forms of
drug diversion, which are limited to first time drug offenders: a defendant may be
eligible for Proposition 36 diversion despite having failed drug treatment for an
earlier offense.
A. How Proposition 36 Works
Proposition 36 imposes a sentence of probation and drug treatment instead of
incarceration for eligible drug offenses. 24 These sentencing provisions apply only
to qualifying nonviolent drug users. A "nonviolent drug possession offense" is
defined in Penal Code section 1210(a) as:
16. CAL. PENALCODE § 1210.1(a) (West Supp. 2004).
17. Id. § 1210.1(c).
18. See id. § 1210.1(a) (mandating probation for any defendant who is "convicted of a nonviolent drug
possession offense" and who is not disqualified by subdivision (b)); see also id. (defining "nonviolent drug
possession offense").
19. See id. § 1210.1(b)(2) (disqualifying persons who are "convicted in the same proceeding of a
misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony"); see also id. § 1210.1(b)(3) (excluding anyone who
possesses certain controlled substances "[wihile using a firearm").
20. See id. § 1210.1(b)(l) (listing the first of five disqualifying criteria).
21. See id. § 1210.1(b)(4) (excluding "[any defendant who refuses drug treatment as a condition of
probation").
22. See id. § 1210.1(b)(2) (disqualifying persons who are "convicted in the same proceeding of a
misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony").
23. See infra Part I.B (comparing Proposition 36 and drug diversion under Penal Code section 1000. 1)
24. E.g., In re Vamell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132, 1135 (2003).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
and except as provided in subdivision (b), any person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall
receive probation.").
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[T]he unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or
transportation for personal use of any controlled substance identified in
[Schedules I-IV of the Controlled Substances Act], or the offense of
being under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of
Section 11550 of the Health and Safety Code. The term "nonviolent drug
possession offense" does not include the possession for sale, production,
26or manufacturing of any controlled substance ....
Accordingly, only defendants who are convicted of personal use offenses are
eligible for Proposition 36.27 Furthermore, Proposition 36 incorporates five
eligibility requirements that narrow the scope of the program by disqualifying
persons who do not meet specific criteria.28
The first requirement is the five-year "washout" provision,29 which excludes
certain defendants who have a violent history. 30 These defendants are disqualified
from Proposition 36 diversion if (during the previous five years) they either were
incarcerated in prison or committed a serious misdemeanor31 or felony.32
The second requirement disqualifies defendants "convicted in the same
proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony., 33 A
"misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs" is defined in Penal Code section
1210(d) as "a misdemeanor that does not involve (1) the simple possession or use
of drugs or drug paraphernalia, or (2) any activity similar to those listed in
paragraph (1)." 34 Although this language suggests a broad base of possible "drug-
related" offenses,35 the implementation of the provision has proven to be quite
narrow.
3 6
26. Id. § 1210(a).
27. Id.
28. See id. § 1210.1(b) (listing the qualifying criteria, including violent history, carrying a weapon, and
being convicted in the same proceeding of a concurrent offense not related to simple drug use).
29. Id. § 1210.1(b)(l).
30. See id. (defining violent history as being "convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies in
violation of subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or 1192.7").
31. Defined as a misdemeanor "involving physical injury or the threat of physical injury to another
person" Id.
32. Other than a nonviolent drug possession offense. Id.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (b)(2) (West Supp. 2004).
34 Id. § 1210.1(d).
35. See People v. Canty, 32 Cal. 4ths 1266, 1276 (2004) (outlining the defendant's contention that
"driving while under the influence of drugs constitutes an activity similar to 'simple possession or use of
drugs"' therefore qualifying the defendant for drug treatment) (emphasis added); CAL. PUB. DEFENDER'S
ASS'N., Analysis of Proposition 36, 22 (2001), at http://www.cpda.org/publicarena/CPDAProp36Analysis.pdf
[hereinafter CPDAI (suggesting that the interpretation of Penal Code section 1210(d) "should be guided by
Proposition 36's purpose and intent"); Appellant's Brief at 15-21, People v. Canty, No. S109537, WL 1918459,
(Cal. Jan. 31, 2003)., ((suggesting that driving under the influence of drugs is within the drafters' intent).
36. See infra Part V.B (discussing the rationale employed by various courts to exclude facially "drug-
related" misdemeanors from Proposition 36 eligibility).
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The third classification of ineligible defendants includes those who were
"using a firearm" while in possession or under the influence of certain
substances. 37 The fourth restriction disqualifies any defendant who refuses drug
treatment as a condition of probation.38 The final criterion disqualifies defendants
who are "unamenable to any and all forms of available treatment."39 Defendants
must be found unamenable "by clear and convincing evidence" after suffering
two separate Proposition 36 drug convictions and participating in two courses of
drug treatment.
40
B. Proposition 36 Compared to Ordinary Drug Diversion
Proposition 36 is not the first California law to provide drug treatment as an
alternative to traditional sentencing. In 1972, California created a program for
first-time drug offenders known as drug diversion (Penal Code section 1001) or
"deferred entry of judgment" (Penal Code section 1000).41 Rather than passing
through a traditional process of judgment and incarceration, diversion
participants receive drug treatment as a condition of probation.42 Diversion was
set up to screen "experimental" users from the criminal justice system and give
them an opportunity to rehabilitate or reform.43 As with Proposition 36 diversion,
once a defendant successfully completes drug diversion or deferred entry of
judgment,an the charges are dismissed and may not be used against the defendant
in the future.45
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(3) (West Supp. 2004).
Any defendant who: (A) While using a firearm, unlawfully possesses any amount of (i) a
substance containing either cocaine base, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, or (ii) a liquid,
non-liquid, plant substance, or hand-rolled cigarette, containing phencyclidine [or] (B) While
using a firearm, is unlawfully under the influence of cocaine base, cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine or phencyclidine [is ineligible for probation].
Id.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(4).
39. Id. § 1210.1(b)(5).
40. Id.
41. Id. §§ 1000-01 (West 1985 & Supp. 2004).
42. See William E. Gagen, Jr., Deferred Entry of Judgment, Diversion, and Preplea Probation Report,
in CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE & PRACTICE 190 (6th ed., 2002):
Deferred entry of judgment is the suspension of criminal proceedings for a prescribed time period
with certain conditions after a defendant's guilty plea. If the defendant is unsuccessful, criminal
proceedings resume, and the defendant, having already pled guilty, is sentenced. If the defendant is
successful in complying with the terms of the deferred entry of judgment, the criminal charges are
dismissed[,] and the defendant may, with certain exceptions, legally answer that he or she has never
been arrested for or charged with the diverted offense.
43. People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), I 1 Cal. 3d 59, 61 (1974) (finding that "diversion [under Penal
Code section 1000] permits the courts to identify the experimental or tentative user before he becomes deeply
involved with drugs, to show him the error of his ways by prompt exposure to educational and counseling
programs in his own community, and to restore him to productive citizenship without the lasting stigma of a
criminal conviction").
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.4 (West 1985 & Supp. 2004) ("Upon successful completion of a deferred
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While Proposition 36 is often administered through the same "drug court" as
drug diversion, 46 it serves a much larger number of offenders because everyone
who commits an eligible offense automatically receives Proposition 36 diversion,
regardless of prior drug convictions.47 By comparison, only one in twenty drug
offenders is eligible for traditional diversion, which is only available to first
offenders.48 Under drug diversion, the defendant enters a guilty plea but is not
convicted until he or she fails to complete the drug treatment program.49 Thus,
treatment in traditional drug diversion is given in lieu of criminal adjudication.50
However, under the typical Proposition 36 disposition, a defendant is
immediately sentenced to probation once he or she pleads guilty to the nonviolent
drug possession charge, 5' and the standard jail or prison sentence is suspended
pending successful completion of drug treatment and all other terms of
52probation.
In both Proposition 36 diversion and drug diversion under Penal Code
section 1001, the court may bifurcate the proceedings in order to handle the drug
offense separately from other charges. However, under Proposition 36, any
entry of judgment program, the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed to have never
occurred."); see also id. § 851.90(a) (West Supp. 2004) (indicating that one who successfully completes their
course of treatment under drug diversion may petition the court to have his or her records sealed, and any
employer who intentionally uses the fact of a divertee's drug arrest as a factor in denying a job opportunity
commits a misdemeanor offense); Gregory A. Forest, Sealing the Record: Helping Rehabilitated First-Time
Drug Offenders to Get Jobs, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 597 (2004) (discussing the 2003 enactment of Penal Code
section 851.90 by Chapter 792).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(d) (West Supp. 2004) ("Dismissal of charges upon successful
completion of drug treatment.").
46. See EVALUATION, infra note 106, at 55 (noting that "19% of counties used a drug court approach to
handle all SACPA offenders").
47. See Uelmen et al., Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, Progress Report (Drug
Policy Alliance, Sacramento, CA.), 2002, at 14 [hereinafter Drug Policy Alliance] (stating that drug courts have
been criticized for admitting disproportionate numbers of white offenders, even though most drug offenders are
not white).
48. See id. (reporting that "drug courts admit only three to five percent of those offenders who are
eligible for admission into drug court"); Maxine Waters, Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 36,
reprinted in CDAA, supra note 9, at B-7 (claiming that "drug courts... serve less than 5% of drug offenders").
49. See Gerald F. Uelmen, A Defense Lawyer's Guide to Proposition 36, 28 CACJ/FORUM 37, 39 (2001)
[hereinafter Uelmen Guide] ("[elven if the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, he is not yet convicted while
undergoing treatment in a diversion or deferred entry of judgment program.").
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1 (West Supp. 2004) (describing how the entry of judgment is
deferred pending successful completion of the treatment program).
51. See id. § 1210.1(c) (providing mandatory timelines for the initiation of diversion and drug treatment
services upon entry "of an order imposing probation"); Uelmen Guide, supra note 49, at 40 (noting that "[flor
most clients, a plea of guilty and immediate sentencing to probation will be the best possible outcome");
Telephone Interview with Jeff Rubin, Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County District Attorney's Office
(Nov. 3, 2003) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (stating that his expectation that Proposition 36
would cause a surge in trials in drug cases did not occur).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("As a condition of probation the court shall
require that the participation in and completion of an appropriate drug treatment program... Probation shall be
imposed by suspending the imposition of sentence.").
53. Id. § 954; People v. Superior Court (Jefferson), 97 Cal. App. 4th 530, 537 (2002) (remarking that, in
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decision to sever counts must be made before the defendant enters a guilty plea
or is convicted.54 Otherwise, any nonviolent drug offenses will not be heard in a
separate proceeding from the accompanying charges that are "not related to the
use of drugs. 55
III. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES BEHIND PROPOSITION 36
The California Ballot Pamphlet for the November 7, 2000 General Election
included the text of Proposition 36, along with arguments for and against the
measure.5 6  In addition to the new Penal Code sections implemented by
Proposition 36, the measure also made specific findings and declarations
concerning underlying policies.5 7 These ballot statements reflect the rationale
behind Proposition 36: (1) drug abuse is medically treatable; 58 (2) incarcerating
nonviolent drug offenders is wasteful; 59 and (3) community safety is best served
by diverting drug offenders out of incarceration and into treatment. 60 Backers
justified the initiative on the ground that it would be specifically limited to
nonviolent drug offenders, and crafted a system of qualifiers to screen out violent
offenders.61
a Proposition 36 case, "the trial court could sever the counts 'in the interests of justice' and 'for good cause
shown"') see also Gagen supra note 42, at 193 (referring to drug diversion).
54. People v. Valenzuela, No. F039735, 2002 WL 31682045, (Cal. Nov. 27, 2002) at *3 (quoting Trial
Court Judge Loretta M. Begen for the position that a Proposition 36 offense could not be separated from other
criminal counts: "basically what the legislation has told us, is that they want to keep it as a package, and either
the person qualifies or does not qualify. And it's unlike the diversion program, where he can divert on one count
and get criminal sanctions on another count. [It] Ujust seems that with [section 1210] paragraph (d) they've
taken it out of that type of theory").
55. See Part V.B.2, infra (discussing the meaning of "the same proceeding" under SACPA).
56. CPDA, supra note 35, at 7 n.I. The Pamphlet is available on the secretary of State's website at
http:l/vote2000.ss.ca.govfvoterGuide/. Id.
57. Proposition 36, supra note 9, reprinted in CDAA, at A-1-12. Proposition 36 is comprised of the
following ten sections: Title (Section 1), Findings and Declarations (Section 2), Purpose and Intent (Section 3),
new code sections related to nonviolent drug possession (Sections 4 thru 6), new funding for drug treatment
(Section 7), the Effective Date (Section 8), provisions for adding amendments (Section 9), and Severability
(Section 10). Id.
58. Id. at § 2, Findings and Declarations, subd. (a) reprinted in CDAA, at A-2 ("[slubstance abuse
treatment is a proven public safety and health measure.").
59. Id. at § 3, Purpose and Intent, subd. (b) reprinted in CDAA, at A-3 (stating as a goal of the initiative
"[tlo halt the wasteful expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars each year [incarcerating] nonviolent drug
users").
60. Id. at § 2, Findings and Declarations, subd. (b) reprinted in CDAA, at A-2 ("Community safety and
health are promoted, and taxpayer dollars are saved, when nonviolent persons convicted of drug possession or
drug use are provided appropriate community-based treatment instead of incarceration."); id. § 3, Purpose and
Intent, subd. (c) reprinted in CDAA, at A-3 (pledging "[t]o enhance public safety by reducing drug-related
crime and preserving jails and prison cells for serious and violent offenders, and to improve public health by
reducing drug abuse and drug dependence through proven and effective drug treatment strategies").
61. Id. at § 3, Purpose and Intent, subd. (a) reprinted in CDAA, at A-2 ("[to divert from incarceration
into community-based substance abuse treatment programs nonviolent defendants, probationers and parolees
charged with simple drug possession or drug use offenses") (emphasis added); see also infra Part V (detailing
the qualifying provisions).
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A. Substance Abuse Is a Medical Condition That Requires Treatment
In response to the flood of new drug cases in the late 1980's, many states
established special drug courts to expedite the disposition of drug cases.62 Some
of these courts embraced a "therapeutic" model that attempted to address the
underlying cause of the defendant's criminal behavior. 63 Advocates of this drug
court model believe that the greater societal problem of illegal drug abuse is best
dealt with by treating (rather than incarcerating) repeat drug offenders. 64 After
all, addicts consume more illegal drugs than recreational users.65
In a recent report, California's independent Little Hoover Commission
6
recommended a "three-pronged" approach to reducing substance abuse by
integrating law enforcement, drug treatment, and prevention techniques. 67 The
Commission reported that the societal impact of drug and alcohol abuse remains
at epidemic proportions, with an annual economic impact of several hundred
billion dollars at the national level.68 In California, drug and alcohol abuse drains
$32.7 billion from the economy each year.69
Advocates of drug courts also argue that the nature of drug addiction makes
the repeat drug offender unresponsive to traditional criminal sentencing.7 ° Critics
of drug courts respond that diversion robs the criminal justice system of its
62. Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora, et at., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 462-63 (1999).
63. See id. at 463-464. "Through a therapeutic, treatment-based approach to the problem of drug abuse,
[drug treatment courts] attack the [biological, psychological and social] cause[s] of repeated drug use and
addiction." Id at 464.
64. Id. at 466-68. "Addicted drug users will not respond to incarceration or loosely supervised parole or
probation because these actions do not address the drug user's addiction." Id. at 467.
65. Id. at 465.
66. About the Commission, at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/about.html (last visited on Mar. 26, 2004):
The Little Hoover Commission . . . is an independent state oversight agency that was created
in 1962. The Commission's mission is to investigate state government operations and-
through reports, recommendations and legislative proposals-promote efficiency, economy
and improved service. By statute, the Commission is a balanced bipartisan board composed of
five citizen members appointed by the Governor, four citizen members appointed by the
Legislature, two Senators and two Assembly members.
Id.
67. LIrLE HOOVER COMM'N, FOR OUR HEALTH & SAFETY: JOINING FORCES TO DEFEAT ADDICTION
40 (Mar. 2003) at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc.html (last visited on September 27, 2004) [hereinafter LHC]
(suggesting that "California could benefit from a multidisciplinary body that includes prevention, treatment, and
law enforcement authorities from the state and local level" and "[s]tate and local leaders need to come together
to link alcohol and drug prevention, treatment and law ... enforcement efforts into a statewide strategy guiding
a three-pronged attack on substance abuse").
68. Id. at 5-6 (citing the estimates of the Office of National Drug Control Policy published in September
2001 and listing "lost productivity, health care expenses, social service costs, criminal justice costs and losses
due to crime" among the "maladies" stemming from the problem of drug and alcohol abuse).
69. Id. at 6.
70. Hora, supra note 61 (suggesting that the psychological, biological and social aspects of drug
addiction mean that "no amount of jail time, probation, fines, or other types of traditional criminal justice
sanctions will prevent the addict from repeating drug abuse behavior").
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deterrent effect.71 However, recent research shows that drug courts actually
reduce drug offender recidivism. 72 Some experts estimate that medical treatment
of drug abuse is seven times more cost-effective than incarceration. 73 For
example, New York's drug courts have saved the state $254 million in
corrections costs.
7 4
Proposition 36 encourages the integration of treatment providers in the
criminal justice system, potentially leading to a consolidated drug control
strategy.75 By increasing the number of drug offenders who receive treatment,
Proposition 36 has had a positive impact on the drug problem.76 Drug treatment
gives people an opportunity to overcome their addictions, improve their lives,
and contribute to their families, thus filling an essential role in California's drug
control strategy.77
B. Incarceration of Drug Addicts Is Wasteful
Arguing that the war on drugs is a "failure, 78 Proposition 36 proponents
suggest that the incarceration of drug addicts is "wasteful." 79 Initiative sponsors
claimed that increased incarceration of nonviolent drug users forced the prison
71. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437, 1477-79 (2000) (deriding
court-ordered drug treatment as a misplaced judicial effort at "social-tinkering" violative of the proper function
of courts under the separation of powers doctrine); Andrew D. Leipold, The War On Drugs and the Puzzle of
Deterrence, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. I 11, 126 (2002) (criticizing Proposition 36 for its failure to distinguish
casual or first-time drug possessors from hardened addicts).
72. See Paul von Zielbauer, Courts' Drug Treatment System Is Found to Help Offenders Steer Clear of
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at New York Report on 28 (discussing a recent New York study by the
Center for Court Innovation that found "the rearrest rate among drug offenders who had completed a court-
monitored treatment plan was 29-percent lower over three years than the rate for the same type of drug
offenders who opt for prison time without treatment").
73. Bluthenthal, The Social Impact of Drugs & the War on Drugs: Public Health vs. Criminalization
Policies, in THE WAR ON DRUGS: ADDICTED TO FAILURE 87 (Benson et al. eds., 2000).
74. von Zielbauer, supra note 72, at 28.
75. See LHC, supra note 67, at 65 (concluding that "initial results [of Proposition 36 implementation]
are promising and illustrate the effectiveness of integrating various services" and "Proposition 36
implementation [is] facilitating service integration [through] 1. A shared commitment to collaboration among
state and local treatment and criminal justice agencies. 2. Leadership by the courts through the Statewide
Proposition 36 Workgroup. 3. Funding that allows the provision of a full continuum of treatment and supportive
services without which treatment outcomes would be sharply limited. 4. Special services for dual diagnosis
clients [ie persons with drug addiction and mental health problems] [and] 5. Co-location of all the treatment and
supportive services required to address the issues of substance abuse, mental illness, trauma, HIV/AIDS and
other health related issues").
76. See, e.g., Interview with Hon. Gary Ransom, Superior Court Judge, Sacramento County Superior
Court (Jan. 9, 2004) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (declaring that Proposition 36 is successfully
turning peoples' lives around and saving the State millions of dollars).
77. See id.; see also LHC, supra note 67, at 63 (advocating drug treatment as part of an integrated
strategy of social services).
78. Maxine Waters, et al., Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 36, reprinted in CDAA, supra note
9, at B-7.
79. Proposition 36, supra note 9, at § 3 Purpose and Intent, subd. (b), reprinted in CDAA, at A-3.
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system to grant early release to violent criminals in order to make room for
nonviolent offenders.8° Indeed, beginning in the 1980's, the prevailing
governmental response to the drug problem was punishment for drug activity
through the imposition of serious criminal penalties.8'
Today there are more than 2.1 million Americans incarcerated, which is four
times greater than in 1980.82 Modern drug laws largely account for this rise.83 In
California for instance, the number of prisoners quadrupled between the 1980's
and the 1990's.84 This is because the penalties for drug offenses increased more
than all other categories of crime.85 Of all the states, California has made the
biggest commitment to incarceration over the last twenty years, building twenty-
one new prisons, including eight maximum-security prisons between 1984 and
1994.86 The California Department of Corrections' current budget is $5.3 billion
(or 6.2 % of the state General Fund), and the department maintains the largest
staff of any single agency in the state with 49,729 employees. 87 According to the
most recent statistics, there are over 150,000 prisoners in California, or nearly
four times the prison population of just twenty years ago.88 One in five prisoners
is a drug offender, and housing drug offenders in prison costs the state of
California $1.3 billion per year.89
80. Peter Banys, et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 36, reprinted in CDAA, at B-2 (reporting
19,300 people were being stuffed into "overcrowded" prisons for minor drug possession offenses each year).
81. See LHC, supra note 67, at 29 (noting that, despite a gradual inclusion of drug treatment and
prevention in the drug control strategy of the federal government, "67 percent of the $19 billion drug control
budget [is spent on] supply reduction or enforcement activities, compared to 33 percent on demand reduction,
prevention and treatment" and "[a]t state and local levels an estimated 80 percent of spending is devoted to
enforcement").
82. Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at
A16.
83. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE
RESTRAINT OF CRIME 162-64 (Oxford U. Press 1995).
84. See id. at 162 (noting "[t]he number serving sentences for drug offenses increased fifteenfold in
twelve years") (emphasis added).
85. See id. at 164 ('The sanctions for drug offenders expanded more rapidly than for any other offender
group between 1985 and 1990.").
86. Eric Schlosser, Prison-Industrial Complex, 282 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51 (Dec. 1998).
87. CAL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Facts and Figures Fourth Quarter 2003, available at http://www.
corr.ca.gov/CommunicationsOffice/factsfigures.asp (last visited September 27, 2004).
88. CAL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Spring 2000 Prison Populations, at T13; and CAL. DEPT. OF
CORRECTIONS, Facts and Figures Fourth Quarter 2003 (noting that once the newest maximum-security
institution is completed (Delano H), the total capacity of the California correctional system will be 176,500.
One half of the prison population is serving time for a crime committed against a person, while 22 percent are
incarcerated for a drug offense, and 21 percent for a property crime).
89. CAL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Fact Sheet "About the Department" (First Quarter 2003), reprinted
in LHC, supra note 67, at 10.
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C. Community Safety Is Best Served by Diverting Nonviolent Drug Offenders
out of Incarceration and into Treatment
Critics of the "war on drugs" expressed skepticism with the policy of prohibition
and incarceration of drug offenders.90 Contrary to the belief that longer sentences
deter drug crime, harsher penalties have had no effect on the rate of drug abuse over
the last twelve years.91 Instead, many states are now learning the value of reducing
the number of non-violent drug offenders in correctional facilities. 92 For example,
Michigan expects to save $41 million in just the first year after abolishing its
mandatory minimum drug laws.93
Saving tax revenue was a principal goal of Proposition 36.94 As the number of
people committed to prison continued to grow, many questioned the increased
spending of public revenue for the incarceration of drug offenders.95 Criminologists
criticized the invocation of public fear of violent crime as a pretext for building new
prisons filled with nonviolent drug offenders.96 Proposition 36 embodies a rejection
of the "wasteful expenditure of millions of dollars" spent punishing nonviolent drug
addicts.97
The overwhelming majority of California voters agreed with the initiative, as
Proposition 36 passed with a sixty-one percent approval rating.98 Proposition 36
proponents demanded that California "try a different approach with nonviolent drug
offenders," 99 and the success of Proposition 36 in the election sent a message to
California legislators to pursue more treatment-based approaches to drug abuse. 1°
90. See, e.g., Drug Policy in America-A Continuing Debate. Report of the Task Force on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions to the King County [Washington] Bar Association Board of Trustees, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 499, 531 (January, 2003) (arguing that incarceration "has not proven to be cost-effective as a means to
reduce the societal costs of drug abuse").
91. Id. at 501 (declaring that rates of drug abuse have "remained relatively steady or have increased"
despite the imposition of tougher sanctions for drug offenses under state and federal law).
92. See Butterfield, supra note 82, at A16 (comparing the movement to expand parole and reduce
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes among 25 states including liberal states like New York and
conservative states such as Alabama, and concluding that many states are recognizing the expense a ballooning
prison population represents, particularly in the current climate of fiscal crises).
93. Id.
94. Proposition 36, supra note 9, at § 3, Purpose and Intent, subd. (b) reprinted in CDAA, at A-3 (stating
that the purpose of the initiative is "[t]o halt the wasteful expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars each
year on the incarceration-and reincarceration-of nonviolent drug users who would be better served by
community-based treatment").
95. See, e.g., THE REAL WAR ON CRtME 16-17 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (attributing the rise in
state and federal prison populations to an increase in the criminalization of minor offenses and incarceration for
nonviolent offenses such as drug possession).
96. See, e.g., id. at 18-19 (citing Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins who describe the phenomenon
in California as a "bait and switch," and attribute the rise in state and federal prison populations to an increase
in the criminalization of minor offenses and incarceration for nonviolent offenses such as drug possession).
97. Proposition 36, supra note 9, at § 3, Purpose and Intent, subd. (b) reprinted in CDAA, at A-3.
98. Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 47, at 3.
99. Peter Banys, et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 36, reprinted in CDAA, supra note 9, at B-2.
100. People v. Letteer, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1308, 1322, n.8 (2002) ("Proposition 36 dramatically changed
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Proposition 36 set aside funding for local treatment programs' 0' and included
monitoring through the release of annual reports by the State Department of
Alcohol and Drug Programs ("ADP"). 10 2 The ADP designated the Integrated
Substance Abuse Programs Office at University of California, Los Angeles
("UCLA") to conduct a comprehensive study of the effects of Proposition 36
over a four-year period.10 3 By the end of the four years, the study may tell
whether Proposition 36 has achieved its goal of "reducing drug related crime. '1°4
The study already has shown how counties have met the short-term goal of
diverting drug possession offenders "into community-based treatment
programs."'' 0 5 In the first twelve months of implementation, more than 30,000
drug users were diverted from jail or prison sentences into drug treatment. 106
D. Proposition 36 Is Limited to Nonviolent Drug Offenders Only
Proposition 36 drew a line between "nonviolent" drug possession and other
drug crimes, such as sale, production, and distribution.' 0 7 The latter are outside
the scope of Proposition 36 and remain punishable with mandatory prison
terms. 108 The differences in sentencing between drug offenses that do and do not
qualify for Proposition 36 are substantial; once the defendant is eligible for
diversion under Proposition 36, he or she cannot be sent to jail or prison.'
9
Instead, qualifying nonviolent drug offenders must be given probation. "10
the penal consequences for those convicted of nonviolent drug possession offenses."); see also CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000
(SACPA-Proposition 36) First Annual Report to the Legislature, at i (Nov. 2002) (stating that Prop 36
"represented a major shift in the state's policy regarding nonviolent drug related use and possession offenses");
Gerald F. Uelmen, Formulating Rational Drug Policy in California, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 769, 775-76 (2002)
(describing Proposition 36 as a "turning point" in California drug policy).
101. Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 47, at 4 (reporting that the initiative appropriated "$120 million
each year for five years to the Substance Abuse and Treatment Trust Fund [administered] by the California
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs").
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Proposition 36, supra note 9, at § 3(c), reprinted in CDAA, at A-3.
105. Id. at § 3(a), reprinted in CDAA, at A-3.
106. DOUGLAS LONGSHORE, PH.D. ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME
PREVENTION ACT 2002 REPORT 5 (July 7, 2003) [hereinafter EVALUATION].
107. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004) (defining "nonviolent drug possession
offense" as "the unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or transportation for personal use of any
controlled substance identified in [schedules I-IV of the Imitation Controlled Substances Act], or the offense of
being under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Section 11550 of the Health and Safety
Code" and providing that "the term 'nonviolent drug possession offense' does not include the possession for
sale, production, or manufacturing of any controlled substance").
108. See id. (mandating that "any person convicted of nonviolent drug possession shall receive
probation"); see also id. ("The term 'nonviolent drug possession offense' does not include the possession for
sale, production, or manufacturing of any controlled substance."); e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
11351 (possession for sale), 11370 (enhancement for prior offenses), 11383 (possession [of methamphetamine
precursor] with intent to manufacture) (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12 10.1(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
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According to arguments advanced in the ballot literature, Proposition 36
would distinguish "simple" drug users from those who sold drugs or committed
violent acts."' The proposition also purported to "only" affect "simple drug
possession" without changing any other laws." 2 The initiative promised that
someone who was "dealing drugs," and one who was charged with committing
"a violent or serious felony," would not be able to participate." 3 In In re Varnell,
the California Supreme Court recognized these "strict limits."
' 14
The next section of this comment discusses the interviews of Proposition 36
practitioners conducted by the author, along with the research data collected by
the State's official study of Proposition 36. In Part V, the qualifying provisions of
Proposition 36 are explored in greater detail, with examples of eligible offenses
and disqualifying collateral offenses taken from published California appellate
cases, unreported opinions, notes from interviews with prosecutors and defense
attorneys, and the results of the epidemiological study by UCLA.
IV. PROPOSITION 36 RESEARCH RESULTS
This Comment is an outgrowth of an internship that the author had in the
summer of 2003 with a public defender's office in a small county. Attorneys
insisted that their clients were being unfairly screened from Proposition 36 by
prosecutors' charging decisions. Over the next year the author investigated
whether, in fact, prosecutors were charging Proposition 36 offenses differently
from one county to the next." 5 The author eventually spoke to over twenty
prosecutors and public defenders assigned to Proposition 36 cases, and one
superior court judge.
The objective of the interviews was to gauge the experience of defense attorneys
and prosecutors concerning the initial phases of charging and plea-bargaining
Proposition 36 cases. The author wanted to see if prosecutors in some counties were
and except as provided in subdivision (b), any person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall
receive probation.").
I 10. See id. (stating "[a] court may not impose incarceration as an additional condition of probation.").
111. See Peter Banys, et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 36, reprinted in CDAA, supra note 9, at
B-2:
Proposition 36 is strictly limited. It only affects those guilty of simple drug possession. If
previously convicted of violent or serious felonies, they will not be eligible for the treatment
program unless they've served their time and have committed no felony crimes for five years.
If convicted of a non-drug crime along with drug possession, they're not eligible. If they're
convicted of selling drugs, they're not eligible.
112. Id.
113. Id.atB-3.
114. In re Vamell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132, 1144 (2003).
115. Initially the author asked different counties whether they had adopted formal charging guidelines
for Proposition 36 offenses. The author found that some counties used checklists in the processing of
Proposition 36 cases, but the author found none that had formal instructions regarding what offenses
prosecutors should or should not charge in drug possession cases.
640
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charging drug offenders with minor offenses, such as invalid vehicle registration,
solely to keep eligible drug offenders from getting Proposition 36 diversion. In one
very small county the District Attorney acknowledged that he could prevent every
defendant charged with drug possession from qualifying for Proposition 36 by
charging an additional misdemeanor offense."16 The prosecutor admitted that he
initially took a hard line approach to Proposition 36 cases, but once the county
provided his office with the necessary funding he accepted Proposition 36 as a new
variant of drug court."17 The author found that the experience of smaller counties was
significantly different than in large urban areas because of the intimate nature of the
community. 1 8 Prosecutors in larger counties were under more pressure to divert
minor drug cases. 19
In large and medium-sized counties prosecutors indicated that they would not
charge cases differently in order to keep people out of Proposition 36.120 In
counties with a large volume of total cases, it is impractical to screen out more
than a few nonviolent drug offenders because there are simply not enough
resources to prove minor incidental charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 121 In one
small county where prosecutors were routinely charging minor vehicle offenses
in Proposition 36 cases, the public defender said attorneys in her office would try
to get the prosecutors to sever the charges in order to make the defendant eligible
for Proposition 36.122
Prosecutors in some counties have taken creative approaches in drug cases
involving traffic stops. For example, in some counties, drug offenders who are
charged with driving without a license are allowed to receive Proposition 36
probation after clearing the violation with the DMV.123 A prosecutor told me that
116. See Telephone Interviews with John Poyner, District Attorney, Colusa County (Jan. 13 and June
15, 2004) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that in the first ten months of Proposition 36
implementation only four defendants qualified for Proposition 36. Today, ten to fifteen defendants get Proposition 36
sentencing every month).
117. Id.
118. For example, in Colusa County the District Attorney explained to the author that he probably knew
fifty of the approximately seventy-five defendants in the Proposition 36 program, and that he would
occasionally see them around town. Id. See also Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Tuttle, District Attorney,
Calaveras County (Jan. 15, 2004) (notes on file with Mc George Law Review) (remarking that in a small county
the District Attorney tends to know each of the Proposition 36 defendants and makes eligibility determinations
on a more individualized basis).
119. The case of Marin County is illustrative. An attorney in the Public Defender's office told the author
that, at the outset of Proposition 36 implementation, the District Attorney asked to be notified if any of the
deputy district attorneys ever charged a defendant unfairly in order to disqualify that person from Proposition
36. In more than two years no such notification has ever been required. Telephone Interview with Jose Varela,
Main County Public Defender's office (Nov. 3, 2003) (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
120. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Anastasia Rozinski, Deputy District Attorney in Santa Cruz
County (Nov. 3, 2003) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (stating that "we don't monkey around with
charges just to make people ineligible").
121. Id.
122. See Telephone Interview with Toni Healy, Lassen County Public Defender (Jan. 30, 2004) (notes
on file with McGeorge Law Review).
123. Telephone Interview with Patrick McGrath, District Attorney, Yuba County (Jan. 16, 2004) (notes
on file with McGeorge Law Review).
2005 / Proposition 36 Eligibility
he allows drug offenders to take Proposition 36 despite a concurrent conviction
for driving on a suspended license. 124 Then, if the defendant subsequently picks
up a second offense for driving on a suspended license the district attorney can
impound (and either sell or destroy) the offender's car. 25 Overall, the interviews
indicated that the cooperation of prosecutors is essential to making Proposition
36 work as intended.
The first annual report on Proposition 36 includes a chapter devoted to the
issue of changes in the criminal justice system in response to the new law.
126
Comparing data on arrests for drug offenses and charging practices in drug
possession prosecutions, the study did not find that the initiative resulted in a
significant change for either. 27 Researchers gathered arrest data from public
records of four California counties to gauge whether the number of arrests for
drug possession and personal use decreased after the passage of the initiative.
121
While the number of arrests for these offenses declined following the passage of
Proposition 36, the study attributed the reduction to the continuation of a
downward trend that predated enactment of the law. 1
29
The UCLA study commissioned qualitative interviews with criminal justice
representatives from a sample of California counties regarding their perceptions
of drug possession prosecutions post-Proposition 36.130 The study did not find
any systematic change in the charging practices of prosecutors in reaction to the
initiative, but the study did find "considerable variability" in the "strictness" of
prosecutors when charging drug possession offenses.' 31 From the outset of this
research the author wanted to uncover whether prosecutors in different counties
considered different drug offenses Proposition 36 eligible, and whether the same
drug offender would be disqualified for the same misdemeanors in different
counties. The UCLA study found that charging practices could differ between
counties without any such change being noticed statewide.t 32 The UCLA study
researched whether different drug offenses were considered eligible for
Proposition 36.133 The largest percentage of respondents considered simple drug
possession 134 to be a Proposition 36 eligible offense, while respondents disagreed
124. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14601 (West Supp. 2004).
125. Telephone Interview with David Wellenbroch, Deputy District Attorney, San Joaquin County (Mar.
4, 2004) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review).
126. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 55.
127. Id. at 65.
128. See id. at 63 (stating that the four counties are Kern, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and Ventura).
129. See id. at 64 ("[Slome observers expected that law enforcement might respond to SACPA by
reducing the number of arrests for SACPA-eligible offenses, and a reduction is indeed what occurred. However,
it is entirely consistent with the declining trend that predated SACPA by four years.").
130. Id. at 58.
131. Id. at 65.
132. Id. at 66 (stating that the "findings suggest that SACPA [Proposition 36] may lead to detectable
change in arrest or charging practices in some counties even if no such change occurs statewide").
133. Id. at 56.
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350 (West Supp. 2004).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
as to which of the other offenses, such as possession of paraphernalia,' 35 were
subject to the law.
136
A limitation of the UCLA study was that it overlooked a technical aspect of
Proposition 36 qualification. The study did not indicate which misdemeanors
would disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36 if charged concurrently with a
nonviolent drug possession offense. 3' From conversations with prosecutors, the
author learned that a serious charge, such as a battery,' 38 would uniformly
disqualify a defendant from diversion under Proposition 36. 139 However, many
felt that "any" concurrent misdemeanor would keep a person out of Proposition
36, even if relatively minor.1 40 Based on conversations that the author had with
prosecutors in over a dozen counties, it is fair to say that the drug treatment
regime enacted by Proposition 36 fails to satisfy prosecutors in all but a few
counties.
From this research, the author concluded that Proposition 36 does what it
purports to do: it places habitual drug users into treatment, without allowing
violent or dangerous drug offenders to take advantage of diversion. While there is
the potential for prosecutors to abuse their discretion by being overly strict in
charging drug offenses, practical limitations on resources prevent them from
systematically undermining Proposition 36.141 Although the probation and
treatment aspects of Proposition 36 were not the focus of the author's research,
the success or failure of Proposition 36 will depend upon how many drug addicts
come clean. 1
42
V. QUALIFYING FOR PROPOSITION 36 DIVERSION
Even though Proposition 36 applies only to convictions, which are assessed
at sentencing, the initial charges that a district attorney files in a complaint
obviously set the parameters for each case. According to California law, multiple
offenses may be charged in the same pleadings if they were committed in the
same event or are of the same type. 143 If an individual is charged only with
135. Id. at § 11364 (West 1991).
136. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 56.
137. See generally id.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1999).
139. Telephone Interview with Johnathan Skillman, Deputy District Attorney, Tehama County (Jan. 15,
2004) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review).
140. One deputy district attorney noted that two offenses, invalid vehicle registration and throwing a
cigarette on a highway (Cal. Vehicle Code sections 4000 and 23111), could never disqualify a person because
the offenses are infractions and not misdemeanors. Lawson, supra note 3.
141. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of defense counsel to
challenge spurious charges by requesting severance or demanding a trial).
142. Prosecutors routinely expressed frustration at the ineffectiveness of drug treatment programs and
the lack of funding for probation. E.g., Rubin, supra note 51 (lamenting the lack of funding for drug treatment
and the overall failure of probation).
143. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985) (explaining that in a case where the defendant is charged
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offenses that are Proposition 36 eligible, he or she will likely enter a guilty plea
and receive diversion at an early stage of the proceedings. However, if the same
individual is also charged with a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs, he
or she will be ineligible for Proposition 36 diversion unless the unrelated charge
is dropped or a jury rejects it.' 44
Therefore, prosecutors enjoy broad prosecutorial discretion' 45 in Proposition
36 cases.1 46 However, as the number of drug cases has grown in recent years, so
has the pressure to quickly resolve nonviolent cases.147  These pressures
compound the ethical choices that shape the charging decision. For example,
ethical rules encourage prosecutors to offer "diversion" for certain cases and to
"be familiar with the resources of social agencies" like counselors and substance
abuse treatment providers. 148 A managing prosecutor is not supposed to pressure
a subordinate prosecutor to file charges that contain a reasonable doubt. 
149
Likewise, prosecutors must not file more charges "than are necessary to fairly
reflect the gravity of the offense."' 150 Therefore, filing an additional charge simply
to thwart Proposition 36 diversion is unethical.'
5'
A. Nonviolent Drug Possession: Personal Use
Proposition 36 does nothing to change existing drug laws other than allow
repeat drug offenders another chance at rehabilitation by postponing the
imposition of incarceration for qualifying offenses. 52 Eligible offenses are
sometimes lumped into the general category of "simple" drug possession for
with multiple offenses, the court may order that the offenses be tried separately "in the interests of justice and
for good cause shown").
144. Practical considerations militate against the addition of charges, since doing so inhibits the speedy
resolution of cases and necessitates extensive preparation by the attorneys and their supporting staff members.
145. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 162-63 (1969)
(discussing the prevalence of police and prosecutorial discretion as a distinguishing feature of the American
criminal justice system).
146. See Part IV, supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (giving examples of the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in Proposition 36 cases).
147. See Uelmen Guide, supra note 49, at 40 (commenting on the need for defense attorneys and
prosecutors in the criminal justice system to work together to expedite the processing of cases).
148. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.8(b) (American Bar Association, 3d ed. 1993).
149. Id. § 3-3.9(c) ("A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in
which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.").
150. Id. § 3-3.9(f).
151. See supra, Part V.B (providing examples of minor misdemeanors, such as Vehicle Code section
12500 (driving without a valid license), that could technically disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36
diversion under Penal Code section 1210.1 (b)(2) if he or she is also convicted (in the same proceeding) of a
nonviolent drug possession offense).
152. See supra, Part M (explaining the basic functioning of Proposition 36 diversion upon entry of
judgment for a qualifying offense); Lawson, supra note 3 (explaining that drug possession before Proposition
36 was punishable by probation with some days in county jail and participation in drug treatment); Rubin, supra
note 51 (stating that, even before Proposition 36, first time offenders were never sent to prison and even second
and third time offenders were rarely sent to prison absent unusual circumstances).
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personal use. 153 The definition of a "nonviolent drug possession offense" includes
"personal use, possession for personal use and transportation for personal use,"
and could encompass a range of minor drug offenses. 54 Other than the crime of
being under the influence of a controlled substance there is no definitive list of
Proposition 36 eligible offenses.
55
1. Unlawful Possession
Proposition 36 was intended to apply to the offense of "simple" drug
possession. 156  The original definition of "nonviolent drug possession" in
Proposition 36 was "the unlawful possession, use or transportation for personal
use of any controlled substance."'' 57 Believing this definition was ambiguous,
opponents of Proposition 36 argued that the words "for personal use" applied
only to "transportation," not "possession," making the definition broad enough to
encompass possession of controlled substances for purposes other than one's own
consumption. 118
However, in its implementation guide to Proposition 36, the California
District Attorney's Association ("CDAA") recognized that "personal use"
referred not only to transportation, but also to possession and use. 159 Thus,
someone carrying a drug for purposes other than his or her own consumption
"would be prosecuted under [existing] laws" and receive a typical sentence of
incarceration if convicted. 60 In 2003 the legislature clarified the definition of
"nonviolent drug possession" to reflect this understanding.' 6' Currently,
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004) ("The term 'nonviolent drug offense' does not
include the possession for sale, production, or manufacture of any controlled substance.").
154. Id.
155. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 56 ("There is no single, complete, and authoritative list of drug-
related offenses governing SACPA eligibility throughout the state.").
156. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 11350, 11357, and 11377 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); Proposition 36,
supra note 9, at § 3(a), reprinted in CDAA, at A-2: (naming "nonviolent defendants, probationers and parolees
charged with simple drug possession or drug use offenses" as the persons subject to the law).
157. CDAA, supra note 9, at 3.
158. Californians United Against Drug Abuse / No on Prop. 36, Compromising Public Safety (one-page
fact sheet), quoted in Campaign for New Drug Policies / Yes on Prop. 36, Whoppers! Told by Opponents of
Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (claiming that "sex offenders convicted of
possessing 'date rape' drugs could escape a jail or prison term").
159 CDAA, supra note 9, at 4.
160. See id. (arguing that possession of a date rape drug intended for the commission of a sex crime is
not "nonviolent drug possession" under SACPA).
161. See SENATE BILL 762, AT 1-2 (Aug. 1, 2003) (clarifying that "[t]he term 'nonviolent drug
possession offense" [is] the unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or transportation for personal
use of any controlled substance.., or the offense of being under the influence of a controlled substance");
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 762, at 1 (May 19, 2003) ("SB 762
restricts the application of Proposition 36 by requiring non-violent drug possession of any controlled substance
be limited to possession for personal use.").
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Proposition 36 covers the "personal use, possession for personal use and
transportation for personal use of a controlled substance."'
' 61
Other offenses are explicitly excluded from the meaning of nonviolent drug
possession: possession for purposes of "sale, production, or manufacturing," or
possession inside a correctional facility.163 The offense of possession for sale is
beyond the reach of Proposition 36,164 and in cases where an intent to sell a drug




Possession for sale is an element of a number of drug offenses, the principal
offenses being possession for sale and transportation. 66 Transportation occurs
whenever an individual "transports, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away"
a controlled substance,' 67 and can even be satisfied by walking down the street
with drugs. 168 In cases where a defendant is charged with a combination of
possession for sale and transportation, but is acquitted of the charge of possession
for sale, he or she is not automatically eligible for Proposition 36 diversion for
the lesser charge of transportation. 69 Instead, the defendant must convince the
trial court at sentencing that the drug was transported for personal use.
170
According to one prosecutor, the amount of the drug in question is only one
factor among many that help determine intent. 7 For instance, the defendant's
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004).
163. Id. ("The term 'nonviolent drug offense' does not include the possession for sale, production, or
manufacture of any controlled substance and does not include violations of [Penal Code] Section 4573.6
[unauthorized possession of controlled substances in prison, camp, jail, etc.] or 4573.8 [unauthorized possession
of drugs or alcoholic beverages in prison, camp, jail, etc.]").
164. Peter Banys, et al., Argument in Favor of Proposition 36, reprinted in CDAA, supra note 9, at B-2
("Proposition 36 is strictly limited. It only affects those guilty of simple drug possession.... If they're
convicted of selling drugs, they're not eligible.").
165. E.g., People v. Barasa, 103 Cal. App. 4th 287 (2002).
166. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11351 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004) (unlawful possession for sale);
id. § 11352 (Transportation, sale, giving away, etc., of designated controlled substances); id. § 11379
(transportation, sale or distribution of controlled substance); id. § 11360 (transportation of marijuana).
167. CAIJIC 12.02 (2004).
168. People v. Ormiston, 105 Cal. App. 4th 676, 683 (2003).
169. People v. Barasa, 103 Cal. App. 4th 287 (2002).
170. Id.
171. See Letter from Thomas M. Wilson, Deputy District Attorney, San Luis Obispo County District
Attorney's Office, (Feb. 17, 2004) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review):
The amount of a controlled substance is only one factor to consider in determining whether a
substance is possessed for personal use or for provision/sale to others. For instance, if a
defendant possessed an amount of a controlled substance that would be consistent with
personal use but admitted in the course of the investigation that he or she intended to sell the
substance (or transported the substance for the purpose of sale), the defendant could be deemed
ineligible for Prop. 36 despite a small quantity of the substance.
Id. at 1.
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admissions that he was dealing drugs, evidence of sales in the form of pay/owe
sheets, packaging indicative of sales or a scale would refute a claim by the
defendant that he possessed the drugs for his own personal use. 172 However, in
People v. Barasa, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated that "in personal use
amount cases, a prosecutor may not avoid the application of Proposition 36
simply by charging the offense as a transportation rather than as a possession."'
173
In the UCLA study, the majority of counties considered transportation to be a
Proposition 36 eligible offense. 174 In some counties transportation of a personal
use amount is charged only as "possession" under Health and Safety section
11350, and is simply not charged as "transportation.' 75 Transportation is often
understood to involve conduct that is closer to drug trafficking or distribution,
and thus outside the concept of "personal use."'176 In fact, in some counties,
"transportation" is not considered Proposition 36 eligible under any
circumstances, even where the amount in question is miniscule.
177
3. Possession of Drugs in Jail
In 2001, the California legislature amended Proposition 36 with Chapter
721.178 Among other revisions, the amendment added an exception to the
definition of "nonviolent drug offense," excluding the offense of possessing a
controlled substance in jail (e.g., Penal Code section 4573.8). 17 9 In their
Proposition 36 implementation guide, the CDAA listed possession in jail as
ineligible for Proposition 36.180 Despite the legislature's agreement with the
CDAA, in an unpublished opinion the Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that
172. See, e.g., Barasa, 103 Cal. App. 4th at 296 (remarking that "there is no possibility that Barasa could
hope to persuade a sentencing judge the drugs he transported were for personal use only, as their quantity and
their packaging, as well as Barasa's admissions, demonstrate the transportation of a significant quantity of drugs
for purposes of sale, rather than personal consumption").
173. Id. at 295 (emphasis added); accord People v. Saenz, No. D039214, 2003 WL 133020, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2003) (remanding a case for reconsideration of Proposition 36 eligibility after correcting an
error in the calculation of dosages).
174. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 60.
175. See Lawson, supra note 3 (explaining that, in her office, the attorneys only charge Health and
Safety Code section 11352 "transportation" with possession for sale, not personal use possession).
176. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(b) (applying to "any person who transports for sale
any controlled substances specified in subdivision (a) within the state, from one county to another
noncontiguous county"); CDAA, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that "transportation of a controlled substance
remains criminal conduct even after the passage of Proposition 36" and suggesting that prosecutors allege that
"the defendant did not transport the controlled substance for personal use" in their pleadings).
177. See Telephone Interview with Lee Blumen, Orange County Public Defender's Office, Appellate
Division, (Jan. 30, 2004) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the case of a defendant
convicted of transportation for bicycling with a personal use amount).
178. Drug Policy Alliance, supra note 47, at 12.
179. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004)
180. CDAA, supra note 9, at 5 (arguing that, despite having a superficial link to drug abuse, possession
in jail is ineligible for SACPA because it involves additional conduct, namely, "commission within a
correctional setting").
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the trial court's decision to disqualify a defendant for Proposition 36 diversion for
possession of drugs in jail had been in error.
181
4. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
The CDAA also considered possession of drug paraphernalia to be a non-
qualifying drug offense when charged by itself, because it "involve[s] more than
the simple possession or use of drugs.' 82  However, since possession of
paraphernalia is explicitly excluded from the definition of "a misdemeanor not
related to the use of drugs" a defendant who is charged with possession of
paraphernalia and being under the influence of a drug is eligible for Proposition
36, assuming none of the other disqualifiers applies.
183
While possession of paraphernalia will not disqualify an otherwise eligible
defendant from Proposition 36, many prosecutors believe that possession of
paraphernalia is not Proposition 36 eligible when charged on its own.' 84 In
Orange County when judges decided that a solo charge of possession of drug
paraphernalia should be Proposition 36 eligible prosecutors challenged the
decision.' 85 The reviewing court rejected the prosecutors' interpretation of the
statute as "absurd," holding instead that possession of drug paraphernalia is
"inextricably linked" to nonviolent drug possession. 186 The court also recognized
the fact that a prosecutor could defeat Proposition 36 merely by dropping a
charge of possession of a controlled substance any time a defendant was also
charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.
87
5. Public Intoxication from Drug Use
The misdemeanor crime of being "under the influence" of a drug (Health and
Safety Code section 11550) is automatically eligible for Proposition 36, as it is
181. People v. Avila, No. G030362, 2003 WL 21419615 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2003). Construing the
pre-amendment version of SACPA, the court held that the defendant had been improperly excluded from
probation since possession of drugs in jail was "necessarily" included in the definition of nonviolent drug
offense. Id. at 4.
182. CDAA, supra note 9, at 5.
183. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210(d), 1210.1(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2004) (defining "misdemeanor not
related to the use of drugs" to exclude possession of drug paraphernalia, and providing that "anyone convicted
of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall receive probation," so long as he or she is not "convicted in the
same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs").
184. See, e.g., Lawson Interview, supra note 3 (noting that the paraphernalia charge would only qualify
for Proposition 36 if charged alongside a qualifying offense, e.g. drug possession for personal use).
185. People v. Superior Court (Stuart), No. 01CC08951, 2001 WL 1153451 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2001) (denying a request by the Anaheim City Attorney for a writ of mandate ordering the sentencing judge to
revoke Proposition 36 diversion for nine individuals convicted solely of possession of drug paraphernalia).
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id.
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included in the definition of a nonviolent drug offense. 88 However, public
intoxication (Penal Code section 647(f)) is a separate crime under California law,
and is a manifestation of the "disorderly conduct" misdemeanor. 89 While public
intoxication is most often associated with the over-consumption of alcohol, the
offense can be charged for public drug intoxication. 90 In either circumstance, the
element of creating a public disturbance must be proven.' 9'
The CDAA implementation guide did not mention public intoxication in its
discussion of offenses not covered by the definition of nonviolent drug
possession. However, the CDAA argued that any offense that requires proof of
some "[a]dditional conduct," such as the element of driving in a driving under the
influence of a drug offense, 192 is distinct from "straight" personal use, and should
not be Proposition 36 eligible under Penal Code section 1210.1(a). 93 The
California Public Defender's Association ("CPDA") analysis of Proposition 36
did not address public drug intoxication. 194 Less than half of respondents to the
UCLA study considered public intoxication to be Proposition 36 eligible.
95
6. Marijuana Cultivation for Personal Use
California Health and Safety section 11358 covers a range of marijuana
related activities, from marijuana that is "plant[ed]," "cultivate[d]," or
"harvest[ed]," to marijuana that is dried or "process[ed].' 96 The CPDA argued
that, at the very least, one who is convicted merely of drying marijuana should be
considered Proposition 36 eligible when the plant is dried for personal use.
9 7
Simple possession of marijuana' 98 is considered Proposition 36 eligible. In fact,
188. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004) (defining "nonviolent drug possession
offense" to include "the offense of being under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of section
11550 of the Health and Safety Code").
189. Id. § 647 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
190. id. § 647(f). The elements of the offense are, (a) being found in a public place, (b) under the
influence of a drug or controlled substance, (c) in such a condition that one is either (i) unable to exercise care
for his or her own safety and the safety of others, or (ii) interfering with the use of a public way. Id.
191. CALJIC 16.430 Disorderly Conduct-Drunk in Public Place:
In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be proved: 1. A person was
found in a public place; 2. That person was willfully under the influence of [alcohol or a
drug] or any combination of [alcohol and a drug]; and 3. That person was in a condition that
[he or she] was unable to exercise care for [his or her] own safety or the safety of others, or 4.
That person, by reason of being under the influence, interfered with or obstructed or
prevented the free use of any street, sidewalk, or other public way.
Id (internal brackets omitted).
192. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 2000).
193. CDAA, supra note 9, at 5.
194. id.; CPDA, supra note 35, at 20.
195. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 62.
196. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 1991).
197. CDAA, supra note 35, at 20.
198. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
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possession of an ounce or less of marijuana is only an infraction, punishable by
no more than a $100 fine. 99
Furthermore, while Penal Code section 1210(a) lists the "production" of a
controlled substance as an exception to nonviolent drug possession,200 individuals
who grow marijuana often rely on the advice of their physician under
California's Compassionate Use Act.20' Consistent with this interpretation, over
80 percent of participants in the UCLA study believed a violation of Health and
Safety section 11358 was Proposition 36 eligible.20 2
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal considered
whether a defendant could receive Proposition 36 diversion for growing
marijuana for personal use.203 After failing to complete deferred entry of
judgment for the offense under Penal Code section 1 0 0 0 ,204 the defendant argued
that Proposition 36 should apply to him because he grew the plants for his
personal use.2°5 The court noted that because the cultivation of marijuana
involves the "production" of a controlled substance, cultivation is not a
"nonviolent drug possession offense" under Proposition 36.206
7. Presumptively Ineligible Offenses: Drug-Related Conduct Other than
Personal Use
Penal Code section 1210(a) explicitly excludes some drug related conduct
from its definition of nonviolent drug possession.20 7 Specifically, the unlawful
possession of a controlled substance for the purposes of "sale, production or
manufacturing" is not covered by Proposition 36.208 To help lawyers determine
whether a given offense is Proposition 36 eligible, the CPDA recommends asking
whether the given offense is closer to "personal use" or "sale, production or
manufacturing. 20 9
199. Id. § 11357(b).
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004) (excluding "possession for sale, production, or
manufacturing" from the definition of "nonviolent drug possession offense").
201 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West Supp. 2004) (stating that "this section shall be
known ... as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996").
202. EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 62.
203. People v. Tiedje, No. F040510, 2003 WL 21949784, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2003).
Defendant argued that he had a "recommendation" from his physician for the marijuana. Id.
204. Id at *1. The court noted that Tiedje did not present a viable Proposition 215 medical defense. Id. at
"12.
205. Id. at *5. According to the record, Tiedje had a total of 122 plants, which he was adept at cloning,
and had converted one of his closets into a grow chamber.
206. Id. at *8 (citing People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1383, 1393, n.6 (1997)). The
court explained how a person who meets the provisions of the Compassionate Use Act is granted a limited
immunity from prosecution and thus would not come within the provisions of SACPA. Id. at *9-* 10.
207 Cal. Penal Code § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004).
208 Id.
209. CPDA, supra note 35, at 20.
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The crimes of possession for sale and transportation both contain the element
of distributing the drug to another,210 and are treated as exclusive of nonviolent
drug possession for "personal use" in circumstances where such intent is
proven. 2 11 Likewise, furnishing a controlled substance is almost uniformly
excluded from Proposition 36.212 Another ineligible drug offense is the crime of
"obtain[ing] [a] [prescription] controlled substance . . . by fraud, deceit, [or]
misrepresentation. 213 In an unpublished opinion, the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the exclusion of a defendant from Proposition 36, even though
he obtained the substance (morphine) for his personal use.214 The trial court
declined to sentence the defendant to diversion, stating that it was less concerned
with treating the defendant's drug addiction than with punishing him for
"endangering other people because of his behavior. 21 5 In reaching its decision to
exclude Health and Safety section 11173 from Proposition 36, the court reasoned
that the "gravamen" of the crime was "fraud. 21 6 This conduct took the offense
out of "simple" drug possession for personal use.217
B. Principal Disqualifier-Concurrent Misdemeanor Not Related to the Use of
Drugs
In addition to the narrow definition of a nonviolent drug possession offense
in Penal Code section 1210, Proposition 36 eligibility is restricted by the five
exceptions listed in Penal Code section 1210.1(b). 218 For instance, Penal Code
section 1210. 1(b)(2) renders ineligible anyone who is convicted of "any felony"
or "a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs" along with a qualifying
nonviolent drug possession offense.21 9 Penal Code section 1210(d) defines
210. E.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11379 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004) ("Transportation, sale
or distribution of specified [i.e. Schedule III, IV and V] controlled substances.").
211. See id. § 11351 (containing the element of possession for sale purposes); id. § 11352(a) (specifying
that "every person who transports, imports into this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away... any
controlled substance.., shall be punished by imprisonment").
212. See id. § 11170 ("[To] prescribe, administer, or furnish a controlled substance."); see e.g., Wilson
Letter, supra note 178 ("any charge that pertains to provision of [controlled] substances to other persons or
aiding and abetting the provision to or use of those substances by other persons (Health & Safety Code section
11365) is not eligible [for Proposition 36].").
213. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11173 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004); People v. Finch, No.
C043296, 2004 WL 65293, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004).
214. Finch, 2004 WL 65293, at * 1.
215. Id. at *2. The defendant "restored an IV where there was a doctor's order [] discontinuing the IV,"
which resulted in the patient getting out of bed and badly injuring his head." Id. at *1. Other patients were
endangered by the defendant's misrepresentation of morphine administration on their charts. Id. at * 1-2.
216. Id. at*3.
217. Id.
218. CAL. PENALCODE § 1210.1 (West Supp. 2004).
219. Id. § 1210.1(b)(2) ("Any defendant who, in addition to one or more nonviolent drug possession
offenses, has been convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any
felony [is ineligible for probation pursuant to subdivision (a)].").
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"misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs" as "a misdemeanor that does not
involve (1) the simple possession or use of drugs or drug paraphernalia, being
present where drugs are used, or failure to register as a drug offender, or (2) any
activity similar to those listed in paragraph (1).22
0
In California, a misdemeanor is any crime that is neither classified as an
infraction nor punished by incarceration in state prison. 22' An infraction is a
crime that is not punishable by incarceration. 222 Penal Code section 17 provides
for some misdemeanors to be charged as infractions by the prosecutor or reduced
to infractions at the discretion of the court.223 In the Vehicle Code, all offenses
are infractions unless specifically designated misdemeanors or felonies.224
Several of these misdemeanors are reducible to infractions under Penal Code
section 17.225
In addition to reducing certain misdemeanors to infractions, the trial judge
also has the discretion to dismiss charges in order to do justice under Penal Code
226section 1385. In its implementation guide, the CPDA argued that it was within
the discretion of the trial court to strike a concurrent misdemeanor for the
purposes of qualifying a defendant for Proposition 36 diversion.227 While the
California Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 1385 is inapplicable to
the washout provision under Penal Code section 1210.1(b)(1), 228 in In re Varnell
the court affirmed the authority of the trial court to dismiss misdemeanor
offenses that would otherwise disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36.229
1. What Is a Drug-Related Misdemeanor?
Penal Code section 1210(d) excludes four misdemeanors from the definition
of "misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs., 230 However, this does not mean
that these offenses are Proposition 36 eligible. For example, the misdemeanor of
220. Id. § 1210(d).
221. Id. § 17.
222. Id. § 19.6.
223. Id. § 17(d)(1)-(2).
224. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40000.1 (West 2000); People v. Oppenheimer, 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp, 4 (1974).
225. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West 1999) (listing Vehicle Code sections 12500 (driving without a
license); 14601.1 (driving with a suspended license); 40508 (absconding); § 42005 (failure to attend traffic
school); and others).
226. Id. § 1385 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); People v. Superior Court (Romero) 917 P.2d 628 (1996)
cited in People v. Ayele, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 266 (2002).
227. CPDA, supra note 35, at 28-29.
228. In re Vamell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132 (2003).
229. Id. at 1143 (stating that "[in the absence of a charge or allegation ... [disqualifying petitioner from
Proposition 36] under subdivision (b) of 1210.1, there was nothing for a court, acting under section 1385, to
dismiss that could render petitioner eligible for mandatory probation or treatment under Proposition 36").
230 CAL. PENAL CODE § 12 10(d) (West Supp. 2004) (defining the term "misdemeanor not related to the
use of drugs" as a "misdemeanor that does not involve (1) the simple possession or use of drugs or drug
paraphernalia, being present where drugs are used, or failure to register as a drug offender, or (2) any activity
similar to those listed in paragraph (1)").
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being present at a location where narcotic substances are being used (Health and
Safety Code section 1 1365),231 is a drug-related misdemeanor under Penal Code
section 1210(d); however, it is not included within the definition of a nonviolent
drug offense in Penal Code section 1210(a).232 In fact, the hallmarks of
"nonviolent drug possession"- use, possession, and transportation for personal
use-are not elements of Health and Safety Code section 11365.233 Likewise,
"possession of [drug] paraphernalia ' 234 is a drug-related misdemeanor for the
purposes of Penal Code section 1210.l(b)(2), but is not included in the definition
of an underlying nonviolent drug possession offense in Penal Code section
1210(a).235 The same is true for "failure to register as a drug offender. 236
Therefore, under a strict interpretation of the statute, none of these offenses
would require Proposition 36 diversion if charged seperately, despite the fact that
each is drug-related.237
2. The Same Proceeding
In California, separate offenses may be charged in the same pleadings if they
are "connected together in their commission" or are "of the same class of crimes
or offenses. 238 According to Penal Code section 1210.1(b)(2), a person is
disqualified from Proposition 36 diversion if he or she is "convicted in the same
,,239proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony.
Trial courts have the discretion to order that separate offenses in the same
information be tried separately, whereby a conviction in one could be considered
a separate proceeding for purposes of Proposition 36.240
231. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11365 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
232. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(b) (West Supp. 2004) (mentioning "presence in a place where
drugs are used") with id. § 12 10(a) (defining "nonviolent drug possession offense" as involving "personal use").
233. CALJIC 16.050 (West 2004) ("Every person who knowingly, willfully and intentionally visits or is
in any ... place where a controlled substance... is being unlawfully smoked or used, and who has knowledge
that the unlawful activity is occurring, and who aids and abets the unlawful activity, is guilty of a violation of
Health and Safety Code [section] 11365, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor.").
234. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
235. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210 (a) (West Supp 2004) (defining a nonviolent drug offense as
"the unlawful personal use, possession for personal use, or transportation for personal use of any controlled
substance") with id. § 1210(d) (providing that a "misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs" does not include
"the simple possession or use ... of drug paraphernalia").
236. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West 1991 & Supp. 2004).
237. While Penal Code section 1210.1(a) is easy to apply in situations where a person is charged with
both possession of a controlled substance and an accompanying misdemeanor (e.g. possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia), the question of whether any one of the three offenses would qualify as Proposition 36
eligible if charged by itself is a matter of some debate. See supra, Part II (comparing various interpretations of
Penal Code sections 1210 and 1210.1).
238. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West 1985).
239. Id. § 1210.1(b)(2) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
240. Id. § 954 (West 1985).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal examined whether a conviction for a
non-drug-related misdemeanor by a separate guilty plea triggered the
disqualifying provision of Penal Code section 1210.1 (b)(2).24 ' The defendant was
charged with nonviolent possession of methamphetamine and an unrelated
242misdemeanor. Because the trial court ."exercised its discretion by creating two
proceedings," the defendant contended that he was not "convicted in the same
proceeding" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1210.1(b)(2). 243 The
prosecution countered that the trial court had merely executed two plea
agreements in a single proceeding.244 The Fourth District agreed that the trial
court had not made two proceedings out of one since "[b]oth charges arose from
a single incident, were charged in the same information, share[d] the same case
number, and the pleas were entered in the same hearing." 245
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached a
similar interpretation of "in the same proceeding.' '246 At trial, the defendant had
argued that his offenses should be severed because they were "the result of
actions that occurred on separate occasions" and were not "transactionally
related. 247 The trial court denied the request for severance.248 The defendant was
convicted in a single trial on one information with one verdict, which made him
ineligible for Proposition 36.249
Besides severance, defendants can avoid disqualification under Penal Code
section 1210.1(b)(2) by convincing the trial court to strike the unrelated
misdemeanor count,25° perhaps by arguing that it was only added to defeat
Proposition 36 diversion. While the California Supreme Court held that a trial
court may not disregard the fact of a defendant's violent history for
disqualification under the "washout" provision of Penal Code section
1210.1(b)(1),2 1 1 it also reaffirmed the function of Penal Code section 1385 to
allow for the dismissal of "individual charges and allegations in a criminal
action.,
252
241. People v. Superior Court (Jefferson), 97 Cal. App. 4th 530 (2002).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 537.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 538.
246. People v. Frausto, No. F040535, 2003 WL 22079973 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2003).
247. Id. at * 1, *3 (noting that defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater and driving with
a suspended license).
248. Id. at *4.
249. Id. (citing People v. Roberto V., 93 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1370 (2001)).
250. CPDA, supra note 35, at 28-29.
251. See infra Part 1V.C (discussing the California Supreme Court's interpretation of Penal Code section
1385 in the context of the five-year washout provision of Penal Code section 1210.l(b)(1)).
252. In re Varnell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132, 1137 (2003) (citing People v. Hernandez, 22 Cal. 4th 512, 524
(2000)).
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3. Concurrent Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
Penal Code section 1210(d) states that "[t]he term 'misdemeanor not related
to the use of drugs' means a misdemeanor that does not involve... the simple
possession... [of] drug paraphernalia., 253 In an unpublished opinion, the Second
District Court of Appeal remanded a case for resentencing where the trial court
found defendant ineligible for Proposition 36 diversion under Penal Code section
1210.1(b)(2) for possession of paraphernalia along with simple drug possession
for personal use.254 The Second District found that the trial court erred in
disqualifying the defendant from Proposition 36, since there was "no question"
that misdemeanor possession of a smoking device was a Proposition 36 eligible
concurrent misdemeanor.
255
4. Theft of a Drug for Personal Use
In People v. Garcia, an employee of a nursing home pled guilty of petty theft
and possession of fentanyl.256 The trial court found Garcia ineligible for
Proposition 36, and sentenced him to six months in county jail. 7 On appeal, the
Third District Court of Appeal remanded the case for resentencing, holding that
since the purpose of the theft was to possess and consume fentanyl, the theft
necessarily involved the "use" of the drug within the meaning of Proposition
36.258 On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the government argued that the
petty theft should not be considered drug-related because it encompassed the
additional element of intent to deprive another of his or her property.259
Unfortunately, the defendant died before the Supreme Court could hear his case,
and the appellate opinion remains vacated by the grant of review.
260
253. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(d) (West Supp. 2004).
254. People v. Jones, No. B 167398, 2004 WL 231786 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2004). A jury found that the
defendant had possessed a single rock of crack cocaine weighing 0.06 grams and a glass cocaine pipe, and the
trial judge sentenced him to two years in state prison for the possession offense and a concurrent 90-day term
for the paraphernalia conviction. Id. at * 1. The judge suspended the two-year sentence, placed the defendant on
36-month probation and ordered him to participate in a nine-month drug treatment program. Id.
255. Id. at *3.
256. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11055(c)(8) (West Supp. 2004) (listing fentanyl as a Schedule
II opiate); see also People v. Garcia, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (2002), vacated by grant of Supreme Court review.
Co-workers found Garcia unconscious on the floor of a restroom with fresh needle marks on his right wrist and
syringe in his right hand, and fentanyl patches lying on the floor next to him. Id. at 726.
257. See People v. Garcia, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (2002).
258. Id. at 727 (reasoning that, as "the word 'involve' generally means 'to have.., as a part of itself to
'contain, include,' 'to require as a necessary accompaniment'.. . when a person steals an illicit drug for the sole
purpose of consuming it and the person immediately ingests the drug, the theft necessarily 'involves' the simple
possession or use of the drug").
259. Brief for Respondent at 11, People v. Garcia, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (2005) (No. S 108472).
260. Marc J. Nolan, Proposition 36 Case Law, 26 PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF 9, 13 n.2 (2004).
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5. Driving Under the Influence of a Drug
In People v. Canty, the Third District Court of Appeal determined that
because driving under the influence ("DUI") includes the element of impaired
driving it is a misdemeanor sufficiently unlike "simple" drug possession to
qualify a defendant for Proposition 36 diversion.26' Upon review the California
Supreme Court agreed, deciding that misdemeanor driving while under the
influence of drugs disqualifies a drug offender from Proposition 36 diversion.262
Impaired driving raises a different public policy concern than merely being under
the influence because of the hazard to other motorists and passersby.263
Similarly, misdemeanors for reckless driving,264 failing to yield, 265 and street
racing2 66 all involve some degree of dangerous or risky driving.267 For example, a
person commits the misdemeanor offense of failing to yield (Vehicle Code
section 2800) if he or she "willfully flees or otherwise attempts to elude a
pursuing peace officer., 268 Under Canty, these misdemeanors would probably
disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36.269
6. Other Vehicle Offenses: Misdemeanors and Infractions
In People v. Orabuena, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reviewed the case
of a defendant who was excluded from Proposition 36 after pleading guilty to
possession of methamphetamine, being under the influence of the same, and
misdemeanor driving on a suspended license.270 The court decided that, even
though the driving on a suspended license charge was a misdemeanor not related
271to the use of drugs, the trial court should have decided whether to exercise its
261. People v. Canty, 32 Cal. 4th 1266, 1275 (2004).
262. Id. at 10-11.
263. Id. at 9-10 (reasoning that driving under the influence of a drug is not "similar" to being under the
influence of a drug because the emphasis is on impaired driving and "the driver's activity as it actually or
potentially affects or 'transacts' with other persons" and because the purpose of outlawing impaired driving is to
protect other people on the roadway, rather than the drug user).
264. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 23103 (West 2000).
265. Id. at § 2800 (referring to the failure "to comply with any lawful order.., of any peace officer").
266. Id. at § 23109.
267. See, e.g., CALJIC 16.840 Reckless Driving (containing the elements of driving a vehicle on a street
or highway "with an intentional or conscious disregard for the safety of [others]").
268. Id. 16.890 Flight From Pursuing Police Officer (requiring that the pursuing peace officer wear a
distinctive uniform, in a marked police car, while "exhibiting at least one lighted red lamp" and "sounding the
siren as may be reasonably necessary").
269. See People v. Canty, 32 Cal. 4th 1266, 1275 (2004) (reasoning that section 23152 of the Vehicle
Code is intended to protect other drivers and people on the roadways, an interest that goes beyond the interest
served by Health and Safety Code section 11550, which is meant to protect the drug user from harming
himself).
270. People v. Orabuena, 116 Cal. App. 4th 84 (2004).
271. Id. Orabuena had four prior convictions for driving on a suspended license. Id.
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discretion to dismiss it.272 As prosecutors had pled the vehicle violation in
Orabuena as a separate count in the complaint, it was within the court's
discretion to strike it "in the interests of justice., 273 Typically, individual
prosecutors themselves have discretion to drop charges in order to make
defendants Proposition 36 eligible.274
In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the
case of a defendant who was disqualified from Proposition 36 by a concurrent
misdemeanor conviction for driving without a valid driver's license. 75 At
sentencing, the defendant moved in the trial court to reduce the misdemeanor to
an infraction.276 The judge denied the defendant's motion, reasoning that it was
too late in the proceedings for the court to reduce the charge. 7 On appeal, the
Fifth District refused to reverse this determination or remand for sentencing,
since the defendant had put himself outside of the "spirit" of Proposition 36 by
testifying that he did not use methamphetamine.27 8
7. Other Misdemeanors
In one California appellate court case, a defendant was denied diversion
under Proposition 36 after being convicted of nonviolent drug possession and
delaying or resisting an officer.279 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that
272. Id. at 2429-30 (discussing the trial court's discretion to dismiss the vehicle code violation pursuant
to Penal Code section 1385).
273. Id. The court distinguished In re Varnell, where the defendant's prior conviction disqualified him
from Proposition 36 under Penal Code section 1210.1(b)(1), because that was a "sentencing factor" not an
"action" within the meaning of Section 1385. Id.
274. E.g., Wilson, supra note 171, at 2 ("Our Deputy DAs are given the discretion on a case-by-case
basis to dismiss concurrent charges in order to render a defendant eligible for Prop. 36 probation.").
275. People v. Macias, No. F041150, 2003 WL 22346640, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2003). A jury
acquitted the defendant of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health and Safety Code section 11378), but
found the defendant guilty of both possession of methamphetamine (Health and Safety Code section 11377) and
transportation of methamphetamine (Health and Safety Code section 11379) and two misdemeanors; driving
without a valid driver's license (Vehicle Code section 12500) and possession of marijuana (Health and Safety
Code section 11357, subd. (b)). Id.
276. Id. The defendant argued that the court had the discretion to reduce the charge under Penal Code
section 17, subd. (d), which states "that a violation of certain enumerated statutes, including, Vehicle Code
section 12500, 'is an infraction when: ... (2) The court, with the consent of the defendant, determines that the
offense is an infraction in which event the case shall proceed as if the defendant had been arraigned on an
infraction complaint."' Id. at *2 n.2.
277. Id. at *2.
278. Id. at *3. The defendant was pulled over by Atwater Police after the officer noticed that the car had
expired registration tags. After learning that the defendant was not licensed to drive, the officer placed the
defendant under arrest and searched the inside of the car where he found a thermos containing four baggies of
methamphetamine totaling over fifty grams. At trial, the defendant testified that he found the thermos by the
side of the road and thought it might belong to a coworker. He did not know it contained methamphetamine; he
had never knowingly driven with methamphetamine in his car; he had never purchased methamphetamine with
his earnings; and he was not a user of methamphetamine. The judge suspended imposition of sentence and
placed defendant on probation for 60 months, with a condition that he serve ten months in county jail. Id. at * 1.
279. People v. Ayele, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262 (2002), superceded by grant of review.
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the resisting arrest misdemeanor was not "drug related" because it contained the
additional element of willfully resisting an officer. 280 Misdemeanor battery on a
police officer has likewise been held to disqualify a defendant from Proposition
36.281
Serious misdemeanors, such as misdemeanors that involve harm to discrete
victims, will disqualify defendants from Proposition 36 diversion in practically
all cases.282 Examples include contributing to the delinquency of a minor and
endangering a child in one's care.283 While literally any misdemeanor other than
the relatively few "drug related" misdemeanors listed in 1210(d) will disqualify a
defendant from Proposition 36 if convicted in the same proceeding as a
nonviolent drug offense,284 prosecutors are relatively likely to omit minor
misdemeanor offenses from the complaint,285 or drop such charges in order to
make defendants eligible.286
C. Secondary Disqualifiers
A defendant who has committed a "serious or violent felony" (as defined in
Penal Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7) will be ineligible for Proposition 36
287unless he or she can satisfy a five-year washout provision. A person who has
committed such a felony must have been out of prison for at least five years,
during which time he or she did not commit another felony (other than a
nonviolent drug offense) or violent misdemeanor, in order to receive Proposition
36 diversion. 288 This five-year period refers to the five years that immediately
precede the current drug offense. 89
280. Id. (reasoning that resisting arrest is not among the limited class of offenses described in Penal
Code section 12 10(d) merely because the defendant's flight was motivated by his desire to dispose of the drug).
281. People v. Montano, No. H023030, 2003 WL 21766517, (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2003).
282. See supra, Part II.D (discussing the intent of voters to exclude defendants who commit "other
crimes" besides nonviolent drug possession).
283. People v. Hubbard, No. F039113, 2003 WL 21040583 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2003).
284. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Jefferson), 97 Cal. App. 4th 530 (2002) (holding that
solicitation of prostitution will disqualify a defendant from Proposition 36).
285. E.g., Telephone Interview with Mike Lomazo, Deputy District Attorney, Riverside County (Feb. 3,
2004) (notes on file with McGeorge Law Review) (stating that virtually any misdemeanor offense would
disqualify a defendant if charged, and discussing prosecutor's discretion to not charge certain offenses in order
to qualify the defendant for Proposition 36 diversion).
286. E.g., Rubin, supra note 51 (stating that minor misdemeanors such as Vehicle Code section 14601,
when charged concurrently with nonviolent drug offenses, are typically dropped during plea negotiations).
287. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (b)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
288. See id. (defining the washout period as "a period of five years in which the defendant remained free
of both prison custody and the commission of an offense that results in (A) a felony conviction other than a
nonviolent drug possession offense, or (B) a misdemeanor conviction involving physical injury of the threat of
physical injury to another person").
289. See Nolan, supra note 260, at 9 (citing People v. Superior Court (Martinez), 104 Cal. App. 4th 692
(2002), for the interpretation of the five year washout provision in Penal Code section 1210.1 (b)(1)).
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In In re Varnell, the California Supreme Court reversed an appellate decision
that held it to be within the trial court's discretion to disregard prior offenses for
purposes of .Proposition 36 eligibility.290 The Court ruled that the discretion
afforded trial courts by Penal Code section 1385 does not cover a defendant's
prior offense because that does not need to be plead and proven as a specific
charge or allegation but is merely a fact for the court to consider at sentencing.291
The Second District Court of Appeal later decided that the washout provision of
the law does not apply to offenses committed as a juvenile, since juveniles are
not "convicted" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1210.1 (b).292
Another way for an individual to lose eligibility for Proposition 36 diversion
is through Penal Code section 1210.1(b)(3). This subsection renders ineligible
those persons who unlawfully possess certain specified substances (cocaine base,
cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, or PCP) while "using a firearm," or who are
under the influence of one of the same substances while using a firearm.
293
D. Voluntary Disqualifiers
The fourth category of defendants who are ineligible for Proposition 36
diversion are those who refuse treatment as a condition of their probation.294
Under this provision, someone who is convicted of a qualifying nonviolent drug
possession offense and wishes to accept a brief jail sentence may do so, despite
having the option to undergo treatment in the community.295 This fourth basis for
disqualification is also triggered in cases where the defendant is unable to
complete a drug treatment program because he or she is deported.
296
E. Unamenability
Finally, an addict who has failed to give up drugs after numerous attempts at
treatment may be declared "unamenable" to treatment.297 Specifically, the
defendant must have two separate convictions for nonviolent drug offenses,
where he or she participated in two different courses of Proposition 36 diversion,
290. 70 P.3d 1037, 1041 (2003). The defendant's assault conviction three years prior to the nonviolent
drug possession offense made him ineligible for treatment. Id.
291. Id.
292. See Nolan, supra note 260, at 10 (citing People v. Westbrook, 100 Cal. App. 4th 378 (2002)). A
prior juvenile adjudication is not a "conviction" for purposes of Proposition 36 eligibility. Id.
293. CAL. PENALCODE § 1210.1(b)(3) (West Supp. 2004).
294. Id. at § 1210.1(b)(4).
295. See McGrath, supra note 123, (reporting the high percentage of defendants in his county who opt
out of treatment because they do not want to stop using drugs).
296. See Nolan, supra note 260, at I1 (citing People v. Espinosa, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1069 (2003)); see
also Telephone Interview with Joan Stein, Deputy District Attorney, San Diego County (Feb. 12, 2004) (notes
on file with McGeorge Law Review).
297. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(b)(5) (West Supp. 2004).
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and he or she must be found unamenable to "any and all forms of treatment"
before he or she may be excluded under this provision.298 Only if these three
requirements are met may a defendant be sentenced to jail, for a maximum of
thirty days.299
VI. CONCLUSION
Anecdotal evidence indicates that there has not been any systematic effort by
prosecutors to undermine Proposition 36 except (perhaps) in a handful of small
rural counties .300 However, the relatively small number of eligible drug offenses,
coupled with the large number of disqualifying misdemeanors, gives a prosecutor
who wishes to avoid Proposition 36 in a given case the ability to do so with greater
ease than initiative drafters anticipated. 30 1 That is why it is crucial for trial courts to
have the discretion to bifurcate proceedings or dismiss misdemeanor charges when
justice demands.3 °2 Fortunately, appellate courts have repeatedly reaffirmed this
power.
30 3
Proposition 36 puts faith in the efficacy of drug treatment, and simultaneously
rejects incarceration of drug addicts as a waste of resources. 304 Proposition 36 seeks
to conserve jail and prison beds for more deserving offenders by getting nonviolent
305drug addicts out of jail and into treatment. But it employs an overbroad and
complex system of qualifiers and disqualifiers that sometimes hinder the screening
of only violent and dangerous individuals. 306 As California's experience with this
new drug treatment option matures, the sweeping change that voters demanded in
2000 may be eroded by judges' incremental adoption of the strict interpretation
307demanded by Proposition 36 opponents.
298. Id.; CDAA, supra note 9, at 13.
299. See CPDA, supra note 35, at 24-27 (arguing that the 30-day provision is a maximum, which
furthers the goal of Proposition 36 to "preserv[e] prison and jail cells for.., violent offenders" by maintaining a
short jail term only for "incorrigible drug addict[s]").
300. See supra Part IV (discussing the research conducted by the author and UCLA).
301. See supra Part V (providing examples of misdemeanor offenses that disqualify defendants from
Proposition 36 when charged in the same proceeding as a nonviolent drug possession offense).
302. See id. (analyzing the discretion of trial courts to dismiss charges under Penal Code section 1385).
303. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court opinion in In re Varnell, and the opinion of the Sixth District
Court of Appeals in People v. Orabuena).
304. See supra Part III (discussing the policy behind Proposition 36).
305. Id.
306. Compare id. (containing statements of purpose and intent of Proposition 36) with supra Part V
(providing examples of cases where defendants were found ineligible for Proposition 36).
307. See supra Part I1 (contrasting the arguments for and against Proposition 36 with the purposes of
the initiative).
